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Abstract
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, a 2-person game in which the players can either coop-
erate or defect, is a common paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation.
In real situations cooperation is almost never all or nothing. This observation is
the motivation for the Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which individuals exhibit
variable degrees of cooperation. It is known that in the presence of spatial structure,
when individuals “play against” (i.e. interact with) their neighbours, and “compare
to” (“learn from”) them, cooperative investments can evolve to considerable lev-
els. Here we examine the effect of increasing the neighbourhood size: we find that
the mean-field limit of no cooperation is reached for a critical neighbourhood size
of about five neighbours on each side in a Moore neighbourhood, which does not
depend on the size of the spatial lattice. We also find the related result that in
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a network of players, the critical average degree (number of neighbours) of nodes
for which defection is the final state does not depend on network size, but only on
the network topology. This critical average degree is considerably (about ten times)
higher for clustered (social) networks, than for distributed random networks. This
result strengthens the argument that clustering is the mechanism which makes the
development and maintenance of the cooperation possible. In the lattice topology,
it is observed that when the neighbourhood sizes for “interacting” and “learning”
differ by more than 0.5, cooperation is not sustainable, even for neighbourhood
sizes that are below the mean-field limit of defection. We also study the evolution of
neighbourhood sizes, as well as investment level. Here we observe that the series of
the interaction and learning neighbourhoods converge, and a final cooperative state
with considerable levels of average investment is achieved.
Key words: Prisoner’s Dilemma, continuous, spatial, lattice, network
1 Introduction
The origin of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology.
Cooperation is essential in the functioning of almost every known biologi-
cal system (Hamilton (1964a), Hamilton (1964b), Trivers (1971), Dugatkin
(1997)). For example, according to Eigen & Schuster (1979), Michod (1983),
and Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry (1995), early replicating molecules may
have cooperated to form larger entities which could encode more information.
Also, the transition from free-living single-cell protists to multicellular organ-
isms seems to have depended on cooperation (Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry
(1995), Buss (1987)).
It is however, difficult to explain why individuals should cooperate. In the
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traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma model of cooperation, defecting individuals al-
ways have a higher fitness than cooperators. Cooperation is not an evolution-
ary stable strategy, because it can be invaded by defectors. Hence, the emer-
gence of cooperation is generally assumed to require repeated play (with mem-
ory) and strategies such as Tit for Tat, or “tags” (Axelrod (1984), Guttman
(1996), Lindgren & Nordahl (1994), Miller (1996)). The work of Nowak & May
(1992) showed that placing ensembles of cooperators and defectors on a lattice
generates changing spatial patterns, in which both cooperators and defectors
persist indefinitely. The introduction of spatial structure changes the picture
from the mean-field result in which defection always wins to a final state with
both cooperators and defectors present. Similar results were obtained by Ep-
stein (1998), who introduced the Demographic Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which
the individuals have a fixed strategy (which is their phenotype), but are placed
in a spatially structured lattice world. Epstein (1998) found that regions of
cooperation persisted in this spatial model. The studies of Nakamaru et al.
(1997), Iwasa et al. (1998), Nakamaru et al. (1998), and Irwin and Taylor
(2001) showed that spatially structured models, such as the lattice model,
produce the clumping of the cooperative players, and then enables them to
invade a population of defectors, but the spatial structure also encourages the
evolution of spiteful behaviour. These models consider the invasiveness and
stability of fully developed, highly cooperative interactions.
The gradual evolution of cooperation from an initially selfish state represents a
more plausible evolutionary scenario. It is then more natural to consider mod-
els in which several degrees of cooperation are possible (Doebeli & Knowlton
(1998), Roberts & Sherratt (1998), Wahl & Nowak (1999a), Wahl & Nowak
(1999b), Szabo´ & Hauert (2002a), Szabo´ & Hauert (2002b), Killingback &
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Doebeli (2002)). When we take into account the possibility of variable levels
of cooperation, we can study the crucial issue of how cooperation can grad-
ually evolve from a non-cooperative initial state. Roberts & Sherratt (1998)
considered a “raise-the-stakes” strategy for the iterated PD, and showed that
it invades and is stable against a number of alternative strategies. Doebeli &
Knowlton (1998) considered interspecific symbiosis in the context of iterated
asymmetric PD, and concluded that such interactions could increase in extent
and frequency if the populations are spatially structured. In this model, strate-
gies with very low levels of cooperation can gradually evolve to much more
cooperative strategies. The end result is a high degree of mutualism between
pairs of interacting individuals that belong to different species.
Killingback et al. (1999) extended the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, intro-
ducing a model of cooperation which is based on the concept of investment,
and develops further the ideas of Doebeli & Knowlton (1998). This evolu-
tionary game is called Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD). Killingback et
al. (1999) showed that intraspecific cooperation easily evolves from very low
levels, and is sustained, with fluctuations, at relatively high levels, when the
game is played in spatially structured populations. Killingback et al. (1999)
assume that individuals play against their immediate neighbours, and also
compare their payoffs to those of the same individual neighbours. It is impor-
tant to know how robust are the results obtained by Killingback et al. (1999)
when these assumptions are relaxed, i.e. when individuals are allowed to play
against more distant neighbours (than their nearest ones), and then compare
their payoffs to those of a different group of neighbours, which may be larger
or smaller than the ones included in the first interaction neighbourhood. Also,
Killingback et al. (1999) conjecture that clustering is the mechanism that al-
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lows the establishment and maintenance of a cooperative state. To investigate
the validity of this hypothesis, we studied the behaviour of the CPD game on
different topologies, such as networks with different clustering properties.
2 The Basic Model: The Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) game between two individuals
is based on the assumption that each of them makes an investment (which
can take any non-negative real value). Making an investment I has the effect
of reducing the fitness of the individual who makes it by “the cost” C(I)
and increasing the fitness of the beneficiary by “the benefit” B(I). So, if two
individuals 1 and 2, play against each other and make investments I1 and I2,
the payoff of 1 is B(I2)−C(I1) and that of 2 is B(I1)−C(I2). Possible benefit
and cost functions are shown in Fig. 1. Cost and benefit functions of this type
are typical of what might be expected in a real biological situation, such as
those discussed by Hart & Hart (1992) and Wilkinson (1984). The common
feature of the functions C(I) and B(I) is that B(I) > C(I) for a range of the
argument 0 < I < Imax (for I > Imax the cost is higher than the benefit, so
it does not make sense for a player to invest an amount higher than Imax).
Limiting the investment levels to just a pair of investment amounts would
bring us back to the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In the absence of an additional structure, i.e. in the mean-field approximation,
or the well-mixed system, the zero-investment strategy is again the winning
one. Starting at any level, investments will gradually evolve to zero, since the
defectors will benefit from the investment of the cooperators without bearing
the costs. Using adaptive dynamics, one can see that the zero investment
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strategy is the evolutionary stable strategy.
3 CPD in a Lattice
Killingback et al. (1999) introduced spatial structure into the model, follow-
ing the general approach of spatial evolutionary game theory (Axelrod (1984),
Nowak & May (1992), Killingback & Doebeli (1996)). The individuals are
placed in the cells of a 2D square lattice. Each individual makes an invest-
ment, and interacts with the individuals within a Moore neighbourhood of
hers. A Moore neighbourhood of, e.g. size one, includes a cell’s eight imme-
diate neighbours: north, northeast, east, southeast, south, southwest, west,
northwest, i.e. a “ring” of “thickness” one neighbour in all directions; that of
size 2 will include all individuals within a “ring” of “thickness” two neighbours
in all directions, etc. In this paper we will refer to the thickness of the interac-
tion neighbourhood as the neighbourhood parameter. The individual will
get payoffs as prescribed by the rules of the game, when playing against each
of the neighbours within her interaction neighbourhood. Her fitness is then the
sum of the payoffs she gets from playing against all her neighbours. (In the
process, the fitness of the neighbours is calculated too, as the sum of the pay-
offs they get from playing against the individuals within their own interaction
neighbourhoods.) She then compares her payoff to those of the individuals
within her learning neighbourhood, whose size (thickness) may be the same
or different from that of the interaction neighbourhood. In traditional spatial
evolutionary game theory, this distinction between the individual’s interaction
and learning neighbourhood is not made, silently assuming that they are the
same. In this paper, we will refer to the thickness of the learning neighbour-
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hood as the dispersal parameter. Our focal individual then identifies the
neighbour with the highest fitness, and adopts that neighbour’s strategy, by
changing the amount of her investment to that of the neighbour’s. At this stage
the investment level of the player can be mutated at a fixed probability. This
corresponds to an economic scenario in which the agents learn (with occasional
errors) from their more successful partners, or to an evolutionary scenario in
which the more successful phenotypes replace the less successful ones (with
mutations). Every few generations the average investment per individual is
calculated.
Killingback et al. (1999) simulated the CPD game in a square lattice with
neighbourhood sizes for both interacting and learning (i.e. both the neigh-
bourhood and dispersal parameters) set to one. They observed that the aver-
age investment increases from an almost zero starting value, to a significant
final level of investment. Its average value for a cost function C(I) = 0.7 · I
and benefit function B(I) = 8 · (1 − e−I), in a 70 × 70 lattice, with peri-
odic boundary conditions, is around 1.05. (The probability of mutations is
set to 0.01, and they follow a Gaussian curve with centre at the individual’s
investment value, and width 10 percent of its peak.) The average investment
amount is maintained close to 1.05 by the dynamics of the spatial system. It is
smaller than the maximum investment Imax, but much larger than the initial
maximum investment amount of 0.0001. The key factor that causes a state
with considerable average investment levels to be established is the fact that
higher investing individuals benefit from clustering together (Killingback et
al. (1999)). This result agrees with those of Nakamaru et al. (1997), Iwasa et
al. (1998), Nakamaru et al. (1998), and Irwin and Taylor (2001).
We introduced “real-time” evolution as follows: every individual gets her own
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“clock” which tells her when to “wake up”, look around, play against the
neighbours within the interaction neighbourhood, compare her payoff to that
of the neighbours within the learning neighbourhood, and revise her strat-
egy. The “wake up” times are generated as − ln(rn) where rn is a random
number with uniform distribution in [0, 1], which guarantees that the events
are independent (Gibson & Bruck (2000)). (This corresponds to asynchronous
updating, but with a different distribution of “wake up” events.) We use the
same lattice size, cost and benefit functions, and mutation rate as Killingback
et al. (1999). After a sufficiently long time (which is of the order of 2 000–3 000
generations), the ensemble again reaches a state with a considerable degree
of cooperativity, and the average investment level is about the same as that
obtained by Killingback et al. (1999). A typical evolutionary outcome is shown
in Fig. 2 (top graph).
Here we can take a moment to discuss the role of mutations. The top graph
in Fig. 2 corresponds to a very high mutation rate of 5%, with Gaussian
distribution; the width of the Gaussian is set at 10% of its height. In Fig. 2, in
the bottom graph, we show a time series obtained for a mutation rate of 0.5%,
width of the Gaussian is 1% of its height. It is clear that the mutation rate
does not determine the mean value of the average investment in the steady
state reached by the system; it rather influences how fast the steady state is
reached (occasional “kicks” by mutations help the average investment grow
quickly), and the magnitude of fluctuations in steady state.
One general question is: what amount of spatial structure do we need (i.e.
how big can neighbourhood sizes become) before we reach the mean-field (all
defection) situation? Keeping a Moore type of neighbourhood, with the neigh-
bourhood and dispersal parameters equal to each-other (for the moment), we
8
consider the cases where an individual plays against everybody within a neigh-
bourhood of radius 2 (24 individuals), 3 (48 individuals), 4 (80 individuals),
and so on. The rules of the game, the cost function, benefit function, mutation
rate, and width of the Gaussian mutation curve, are kept fixed and equal to
those used by Killingback et al. (1999). For each case, we averaged over 500
realisations of the system, and report results obtained on a 70 × 70 lattice,
unless otherwise stated.
For neighbourhood and dispersal parameters equal to 2 (i.e. a neighbourhood
that includes 24 individuals, as opposed to 8 for neighbourhood parameter
1), the final average investment value is very close to that obtained when
those parameters are 1. When we increase the neighbourhood and dispersal
parameters to 3, the final average investment drops to around 0.85, and it
drops even further to about 0.6 for parameters’ values equal to 4. For larger
lattice sizes we get similar values of average investment in the steady state.
Some typical runs are shown in Fig. 3 for lattice size 70× 70.
The picture changes qualitatively when the neighbourhood and dispersal pa-
rameters become 5. Even though we start with a relatively large initial invest-
ment, the final average investment is extremely small (about 0.04, as opposed
to 0.6 for a size four neighbourhood), and can occasionally drop to zero under
the influence of even moderate fluctuations. This is shown in Fig. 4. The grad-
ual drop in the value of average investment as we increase the neighbourhood
size is typical for nonequilibrium phase transitions. For larger lattice sizes we
get similar results for the average investment, but, as expected, the fluctua-
tions are lower. We can then state that at this neighbourhood size we have
reached the mean-field limit, i.e. the picture we would obtain in absence of a
spatial structure altogether (which for the CPD corresponds to a state of pure
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defection, as discussed above). The value of the neighbourhood and dispersal
parameters for which the mean-field limit is reached was found to be indepen-
dent of the lattice size, at least for reasonably large lattices (the meaning of
“reasonably large” will become clear in the next paragraph). The immediate
neighbourhood comprises about 100 individuals, while the extended one (the
neighbours of the neighbours) comprises about 300. Furthermore, the results
were independent of the choice of the boundary conditions; they hold also
when periodic boundary conditions are not used (and the last row cells have
only five neighbours, as opposed to eight the other cells have, for a size one
neighbourhood, and similarly for other neighbourhood sizes).
Let us now examine the role of the ratio of the neighbourhood size to lattice
size. In Fig. 5 we show a time series of average investment for the case when
both the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters are 4, and the lattice size is
30×30. It is important to note that for smaller lattices the size of fluctuations
can become comparable to the average investment amount, even when the
latter is considerably above zero, and often a mutation is enough to bring the
average investment amount to zero. The average investment does come “dan-
gerously” close to zero a few times in Fig. 5, and we observed it drop to zero in
many other runs not shown here. So, if the lattice is too small, the fluctuations
are enormous, and one might be misled by the result of a particular simula-
tion. (For nonequilibrium phase transitions like this one, physicists scale the
average investment with the lattice size, but this goes beyond the purpose of
the present paper.) The 70×70 lattice size we worked with (most of the time)
is large enough to keep the fluctuations moderate, but also small enough to
allow our simulations to run within reasonable times. We can conclude, based
on our simulations, that the neighbourhood size for which we achieve the
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mean-field limit is about 5, and does not depend on the lattice size (at least
for reasonably large lattices), contrary to the expectations of Killingback et
al. (1999). The larger neighbourhood sizes “expose” the players that sit close
to the borders of the square to a larger number of defector “outsiders”, whose
easily earned large payoffs might “tempt” our players. The numbers of these
“tempters” only depend on the neighbourhood size. However, the lattice size
influences a very important factor, the size of the fluctuations, which can make
or break the fate of the cooperative state.
4 Variable Neighbourhood Size, the Role of Information, and Evo-
lution
The above results were obtained when the size of the interaction neighbour-
hood was the same as that of the learning neighbourhood. It is interesting to
investigate what happens when this requirement is relaxed, and the neighbour-
hood and dispersal parameters are allowed to be different from each-other. For
this purpose, we simulated a situation in which our agents play against indi-
viduals within a certain neighbourhood, but compare their payoffs to those
of individuals within a neighbourhood that is different from their interaction
neighbourhood. We observe that, if the neighbourhood parameter differs from
the dispersal parameter by one or more, then cooperation is no longer sus-
tained. Furthermore, the final state is defection, independent of whether the
neighbourhood parameter is larger than the dispersal one, or vice-versa. It ap-
pears as if, when the neighbourhood parameter is smaller than the dispersal
parameter, the defectors outside the interaction neighbourhood, but within
the learning neighbourhood, manage to “tempt” the cooperators. While in
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the case when the neighbourhood parameter is larger than the dispersal one,
there are simply too many defectors in the interaction neighbourhood, taking
advantage of the cooperators. In the economic context, too little or too much
information favours defection, and kills the incentive to cooperate.
In the real life, however, there is no rigid separation of neighbourhoods from
one-another. Individuals interact not only within a strictly defined neighbour-
hood, but rather occasionally include other individuals in their sphere of re-
lations. This motivated us to determine what fractional difference between
the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters is required for cooperation to be
no longer sustained. This can be studied in our model by making the neigh-
bourhood and dispersal parameters “continuous”. To do this we constructed a
“fractional size” neighbourhood in the following way: suppose the parameter
has the form < m.n > withm the integer part and < 0.n > the fractional part.
Then for the (m + 1)-th neighbour we generate a random number with uni-
form distribution in [0, 1]. If the random number is smaller than < 0.n >, the
individual plays against this particular neighbour, otherwise the next event in
the queue is generated. If the neighbour is at the corner, the random number
is compared to (0.n)2 (i.e. the fractional area of the rectangle). The remaining
rules of the game are unchanged.
We find in this situation that cooperation only persists for differences between
parameters up to about 0.5, and breaks down when the difference between the
neighbourhood and dispersal parameters is 0.5 or larger. We have looked at
both the case when the neighbourhood parameter is larger or smaller than
the dispersal parameter. The results are the same: as soon as the difference
between the two parameters becomes larger than 0.5, cooperation vanishes.
Some results with different neighbourhood and dispersal parameters are shown
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in Fig. 6. Here we can see that the average investment has already dropped to
zero, when the difference between the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters
reaches 0.6, and is very small, when that difference is 0.5.
There is no reason why every agent should have the same parameters, so we
may treat them as “local”, i.e. every individual has her own neighbourhood
and dispersal parameters, ni and di, which generally are not integers. When
her turn comes, she plays against individuals within a neighbourhood of radius
ni and then compares herself to the individuals within the neighbourhood of
radius di. However, there are cases when she meets a neighbour j, whose
dispersal parameter is smaller than hers (i.e. he does not “see” her, even
though she “sees” him). In such cases she could include him into her learning
neighbourhood, comparing her payoff to his, and then adopting his investment
amount, if he is doing better than her. This would correspond to the economics
scenario, when the focal player can learn from players who do not see her.
Otherwise she could leave that player who is doing better than her, but cannot
see her, out of her learning neighbourhood, even though she sees him. This
would correspond to the evolutionary scenario, where a player can only take
over a cell he does see. A natural question is: do the two scenarios lead to
different results?
We consider both possibilities: first when she does compare her payoff to that
of the neighbour with a smaller dispersal parameter (and, if he is doing better,
adopts his strategy, i.e. investment amount), and second when she does not.
For that we had both the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters initialized
randomly between the values 1 and 4 (which are the interesting values, since
for larger parameters there is no sustainable cooperation). The neighbourhood
and dispersal parameters are treated as evolutionary phenotypes: the param-
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eters of the neighbour that is doing better are adopted, together with the
value of the investment amount. Both parameters, as well as the investment
amount, are set to mutate at a rate of 0.01, following a Gaussian curve with
a width 10 % of its peak.
In both scenarios, something interesting happens with the neighbourhood and
dispersal parameters: in Fig. 7 (a) we plot their initial values, which are uni-
formly distributed within a square. At the end of the simulation, we find their
values have converged closer to the diagonal ni = di (see Fig. 7 (b)). The con-
vergence of the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters toward each-other
corresponds to the development of a cooperative state, after which the aver-
age investment continues to sustain relatively high values, almost as high as
those initially reported by Killingback et al. (1999), but the fluctuations are
now larger. A typical time series for the average investment in the evolutionary
scenario is shown in Fig. 8.
5 CPD in a Network
Based on the observed dynamics of the spatial CPD on regular lattices, Killing-
back et al. (1999) formulated the hypothesis that the mechanism that facili-
tates and maintains cooperation in worlds of this particular topology is their
clustering properties. It is not easy to study this hypothesis within the regular
lattices topology, since, in order to verify or refute it, we would have to obtain
results on other topologies, different from the regular lattices. Furthermore,
for many systems of interacting individuals, the regular lattices do not provide
a fully adequate model for the observed topological properties. These proper-
ties include large clustering, and short average path length between any two
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nodes (individuals, in our context).
Watts and Strogatz first introduced “small world networks” (Watts & Strogatz
(1998), Watts (1998)), which are clustered structures. A spatial structure is
called clustered, if the existence of links between nodes A and B, and B and C,
makes it very probable that there be a link between A and C (sociologists call
this “transitivity”). The regular lattices are highly clustered structures. They
also exhibit a long path length, i.e. the number of intermediate nodes between
any two nodes A and B is usually large. The random graphs of Erdo¨s and
Re´nyi (Bolloba´s (1985)), in which a node links to any other with a constant
probability, have short path lengths between nodes, but exhibit no clustering,
i.e. are very distributed structures. A small world network has the two proper-
ties of high clustering and short average path length between two nodes, which
increases with the network size N as the logarithm of N (Watts & Strogatz
(1998), Amaral et al.(2000)). Social networks (i.e. networks in which humans
constitute the nodes, and acquaintances the links) are examples of small world
networks (Strogatz (2001), Albert & Baraba´si (2002), Dorogovtsev & Mendes
(2002)). A special class of small world networks are the scale-free ones, in
which the degree (i.e. the number of the links a node has) distribution obeys a
power law (hence it is independent of network size). Many algorithms for gen-
erating scale-free networks have been proposed. This kind of topology is also
observed in some social networks (Strogatz (2001), Albert & Baraba´si (2002),
Dorogovtsev & Mendes (2002), Newman (2001), Baraba´si et al. (2002), Ebel
et al. (2002a)).
Davidsen, Ebel, and Bornholdt (Davidsen et al.(2002), Ebel et al.(2002b))
introduced an algorithm that produces small world networks which follow
closely the characteristics of social and acquaintance networks. Their basic
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assumption is that the mechanism which generates these networks is that
people are introduced to one-another by a common acquaintance, so-called
transitive linking. At each time step two processes take place: (i) A randomly
chosen individual introduces two (randomly picked) acquaintances of hers to
one-another. If this individual has less than two acquaintances, she introduces
herself to a randomly picked individual. (ii) One randomly chosen individual
leaves the network with probability p. All her links are disconnected, and she
is replaced by a new individual with one randomly picked acquaintance. This
probability p, which is called the death probability, is typically very small.
The size of the network N remains constant in the process. The finite lifetime
of links brings the network to a steady state, in which the degree distribution
is exponential for larger death rates, and becomes power law (with a cutoff)
as the death rate decreases.
The hypothesis that clustering in lattices is the key factor that makes possible
the establishment and maintenance of cooperation can be verified in networks
of different topologies, since some of them exhibit large clustering, and some
do not. To do this, we study the evolution of average investment in social net-
works, and also in random networks, for comparison. The two topologies were
chosen, since they represent extremes when clustering properties in networks
are considered: the random networks are distributed structures with very little
clustering, while the social networks exhibit a high clustering degree. Also, in
these two structures we can tune the connectivity (defined as the ratio of the
actual number of links in the network to the total number of all possible links):
for the random networks it is equal to the probability of linking between two
nodes, while for the social networks model it can be varied by varying the
death probability.
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The game proceeds as follows: “wake-up” times are generated for each node
as − ln(rn), where rn is a random number with uniform distribution in [0, 1].
The picked node then plays against the nodes it can “see”, i.e. it is linked to.
Recall that in a network each node can have different degrees, i.e. number of
immediate neighbours. This means that what we previously called neighbour-
hood parameter differs from node to node, and is equal to the degree of the
focal node (player). This focal player then calculates her payoff from playing
against her immediate neighbours, according to the rules of the CPD game.
These neighbours also play against their immediate neighbours, and calculate
their respective payoffs. The picked (focal) node then compares her playoff to
that of the neighbour that is doing best, among her immediate neighbours.
The neighbours she compares herself with (learns from) are the same ones she
played against (interacted with), i.e. albeit different from one node to another,
the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters for one node are equal to each-
other (and the degree of that node). The focal node then adopts the investment
amount of the neighbour that is doing best as her new investment amount,
and then the next event is generated. The process is iterated, and the average
investment is calculated every few “generations”. This process is repeated for
different network sizes and averaged over 100 different configurations for each
network size.
For any fully connected (saturated) network, with connectivity equal to one,
the final state will be of pure defection, since this is a well-mixed system, in
which “everybody sees (or connects to) everybody”. As the connectivity de-
creases, for each network size there is a certain threshold value, for which the
final state ceases to be that of pure defection, but rather a very small aver-
age investment. As the connectivity decreases even further, the steady state
17
average investment increases. The variation of average investment with the
connectivity for a social network with N = 6 000 nodes is shown in Fig. 9.
The transition from the cooperative network to the non-cooperative one is
what physicists call a critical transition, i.e. the value of the average invest-
ment decays slowly, as opposed to exhibiting a sharp drop at the crossover
connectivity value.
For a random network of the same size (N = 6 000), the same transition is
present, but the connectivity for which the transition happens is Cr = 0.003.
This critical connectivity is much smaller than Cs ≃ 0.025 we obtained for
a social network of the same size. Since the fundamental difference between
social and random networks is in their clustering properties, it is natural to
check the dependence of the average degree (number of neighbours) per node
at the transition point on the network size for both topologies. The results
are shown in Fig. 10. For both topologies, the critical average degree remains
essentially constant as the network size is varied. It is about 150 for the so-
cial network model, and about 20 for the random network. This surprising
result is a very strong argument in favour of the hypothesis that clustering
is the key mechanism which leads to cooperation being first established and
then maintained. Indeed, social networks, with their pronounced tendency to
cluster, maintain the cooperative state for a much larger average connectivity
(and node degree) than the maximally distributed random networks.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the behaviour of the Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma model
on different spatial structures, including two-dimensional lattices and networks
18
of different topologies. The Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma is an evolutionary
game which is a natural extension of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the
Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma each individual makes an investment in favour
of herself and the neighbours, and the investment takes on any value, not just
two discrete values. In spatial structures like the ones we have considered, and
for small neighbourhood sizes/connectivities the investment levels evolve by
getting higher and stabilizing around a given value in a steady state.
The cooperation develops and is maintained relatively easy, which leads us
to believe that the cooperation is not such a difficult evolutionary paradox.
We have tested this in the case of the square lattice, by increasing the neigh-
bourhood sizes, and found that the neighbourhood size for which the steady
state is pure defection is about 100 neighbours. As long as the number of the
neighbours the individual plays against (which we call the neighbourhood pa-
rameter) and that of the neighbours the individual compares herself to (called
the dispersal parameter) remains the same, the cooperation is quite robust.
The mean–field neighbourhood size limit does not depend on the size of the
lattice, as long as the lattice is reasonably large.
Since the interaction neighbourhood and the learning neighbourhood do not
have to coincide with one-another, we studied the game when the neighbour-
hood and dispersal parameters are different. In this case, we found that co-
operation only develops for differences between them of about 0.5 or smaller.
Too little information favours defection, but apparently so does too much in-
formation. Something interesting happens when we allow the neighbourhood
and dispersal parameters to mutate, and at the same time, treat them as
phenotypes: they are adopted, together with the investment amount of the in-
dividual that is doing better. The values of the neighbourhood and dispersal
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parameters converge toward one-another, i.e. their differences decrease. Coop-
eration persists, and the average investment fluctuates around relatively high
levels in the steady state.
We verified the hypothesis that clustering is the factor that facilitates and
maintains high average investment values by considering players in networks
of different topologies. In all of them, a transition is observed between the
cooperative steady state and the purely defective one, as the connectivity of
the network increases. For both social networks and random ones, the average
degree at the transition point is practically independent of the network size.
However, the average degree at transition for social networks is about 150,
while that for random networks is much lower (about 20). The two topologies
differ in their degree of clustering. The social networks topology, with its
pronounced tendency to cluster, allows the establishment and maintenance of
a cooperative state, something the distributed random networks topology do
not. However, when the connectivity of the network exceeds a certain value (i.e.
too many individuals “see” one-another and communicate), cooperation can
not develop or be maintained, and the steady state strategy is pure defection.
The CPD model deepens our understanding as to how cooperation has evolved
gradually from lower to higher levels in many spatially structured systems,
where the entities involved can vary from replicating molecules to whole or-
ganisms (Wilson (1980), Michod (1983), Buss (1987), Maynard Smith & Sza-
thma´ry (1995), Dugatkin (1997)): the clustered topology helps cooperation
develop and survive. It is very encouraging that cooperation is quite robust in
such systems. On the other hand, in the economic world, globalization brings
about an increase in the connectivities of social and economic networks, and
cooperation may consequently be less likely to persist.
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Fig. 1. Possible benefit and cost functions for the CPD game.
26
Fig. 2. The evolution of average investment with time when we only consider the
nearest neighbours for interaction-control run. The top graphh shows a time se-
ries obtained for a high mutation rate of 5%, the bottom graph corresponds to a
mutation rate of 0.5%.
27
Fig. 3. Average investment vs. time for the cases when we consider more than one
neighbour, here the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters are equal and vary
from 2 to 4.
Fig. 4. In the case when the neighbourhood and dispersal parameter become 5, we
are at the mean–field limit.
28
Fig. 5. The evolution of average investment with time in the case when both the
neighbourhood and dispersal parameters are 4, but the lattice size is 30× 30. Note
the huge fluctuations, which bring the investment very close to zero as a result of
mutations.
29
Fig. 6. When both neighbourhood and dispersal parameters are “continuous”, the
cooperation dies when their difference is about 0.5. All graphs are for neighbourhood
parameter equal to 2; the top graph is the control one, corresponding to dispersal
parameter equal to 2, then follow from top to bottom the time series for dispersal
parameters equal to 2.2 (average investment in steady state is the same as for
dispersal parameter equal to 1.8), then dispersal parameters equal to 1.6 and 1.5.
When the dispersal parameter is 1.4, the final average investment drops to zero.
30
Fig. 7. (a) At the start of the run the neighbourhood and dispersal parameters
are uniformly distributed between the values 1 and 4. (b) At the end, they have
converged toward one-another. The distribution of points is closer to the diagonal
ni = di.
31
Fig. 8. The evolution of the average investment when both neighbourhood and dis-
persal parameters mutate, and are passed on from the more successful individual to
the less successful one. Cooperation persists and investment remains at considerable
levels.
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Fig. 9. The variation of average investment in the steady state with the connectivity
for a social network of size N = 6 000.
Fig. 10. The average degree at transition vs. network size. The average degree re-
mains practically constant, but for the social networks it is much higher than for
the random networks.
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